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warrant, as prescribed by People v. Stout People v. Scoma (1969) 71 A.C. 349, 357, 
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 184, 192, 57 Cal.Rptr. 152, 78 Cal.Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419.) 
158, 424 P.2d 704, 780, namely, "whether the I would grant a peremptory writ of man-
facts contained in the affidavit are such date directing the respondent superior 
as would lead a man of ordinary caution court to order the disclosure of the identity 
or prudence to believe, and ~onscientious- of the confidential informer, but I would 
Iy entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt deny a writ ordering suppression of evi-
of the accused." To the foregoing rule dence. 
must be added the Spinelli caveat that the 
test to be applied by the magistrate is that 
"based upon a common-sense reading of 
the entire affidavit." 
The majority cling to the rhetoric but 
overlook the ratio decidendi of Aguilar and 
Spinelli. It is, as noted on pages 110--111 
of 378 U.S., on page 1512 of 84 S.Ct. of 
Agui/a,r, that an "evaluation of the consti-
tutionality of a search warrant should be-
gin with the rule that 'the informed and 
deliberate detenninations of magistrates 
empowered to issue warrants * * * are 
to be preferred over the hurried action of 
officers '" * *,''' and that the protection 
of the Fourth Amendm~nt consists in re-
quiring that the inferences of reasonable 
men" 'be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" 
The affidavit for this warrant was de-
tailed, not merely an abbreviated form. It 
was submitted to a neutral and detached 
magistrate. It was thoughtfully reviewed 
in a lO-page memorandum by the superior 
court judge. It was reviewed again by the 
Court of Appeal, which denied petitions 
for prohibition and mandate. I cannot hold 
that all three courts erroneously approved 
the issuance of the warrant. 
In finding error, the majority now add 
another to the unfortunate congeries of 
cases that can only have an inhibiting ef-
fect upon law enforcement agencies which 
seek in good faith to comply with the 
public policy favoring reliance upon war-
rants instead of probable cause. (See my 
<1issents in People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal. 
2d 418, 431, 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321; 
People v. Hamilton (1969) supra, 71 A.C. 
189, 196, 77 Cal.Rptr. 785, 454 P.2d 681; 
BURKE, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. I would uphold the trial court's 
determination that the informer was not 
a material witness on the issue of guilt~ 
and that disclosure 'of his identity was not 
prerequisite to a fair trial. 
I concur in that portion of the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Mosk upholding the suf-
ficiency of the affidavit for the issuance 
of the search warrant for the reasons 
stated therein. 
I would deny the issuance of a writ un-
der these circumstances. 







83 Cal.Rptr. 375 
and 
In re Ted BUSH MAN on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 13712. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 27, 1970. 
Proceeding for writ of habeas corpus. 
The Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J., held 
that the statute providing that every person 
who maliciously and willfully disturbs the 
peace or quiet of any person by tumultuous 
or offensive conduct is guilty of misde-
meanor is not violative of free speech in-
asmuch as it does not make criminal any 
nonviolent act unless the act incites or 
threatens to incite others to violence, the 
court also held that where defendant had 
taken a bucket of gravel swept from an 
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airport runway to a meeting and, according 
to his testimony, accidentally spilled gravel 
on the desk and papers of an airport board 
officer, the court erred prejudicially in so 
defining "offensive" as to include conduct 
protected by the First Amendment and in 
failing to instruct on the contention that 
the spilling was accidental. 
Writ granted and petitioner discha rged 
Burke and McComb, JJ., dissented. 
I. Criminal Law ~13 
Statute providing that every person 
who maliciously and willfully disturbs peace 
or quiet of any person by tumultuous or 
offensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor 
is not unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415. 
2. Breach of the Peace ~I 
Phrases "disturb the peace" and 
"breach of the peace" as used in misde-
meanor statute are substantially synonymous 
and are taken to mean disruption of public 
order by acts which are themselves violent 
or which tend to incite others to violence. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Breach of the Peace ~I 
Constitutional Law ~90 
Statute providing that every person who 
maliciously and willfully disturbs peace or 
quiet of any person by tumultuous or of-
fensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor 
:is not, as construed by courts, violative 
of First Amendment free speech guaranty. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; U.S.C.A. 
Canst. Amend. 1. 
4. Constitutional Law ~90 
Not all acts intended to express ideas 
or convey information are protected forms 
of speech. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1. 
5. Criminal Law ~5 
When public order and safety are 
threatened by violence, states may restrict 
or punish conduct which creates such 
threat. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; U.S. 
c.A.Const. Amend. 1. 
6. Breach of the Peace cg:::,1 
Statute providing that every person who 
maliciously and willfully disturbs peace 
or quiet of any person by tumultuous or 
offensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor 
does not make criminal any nonviolent act 
unless act incites or threatens to incite 
others to violence. West's Ann.Pen.Code, 
§ 415. 
7. Breach of the Peace €::::>II 
Criminal Law <PI 172(1), 1173(2) 
Where defendant had taken bucket of 
gravel swept from airport runway to meet-
ing and, according to his testimony, acci-
dentally spilled gravel on desk and papers 
of airport board officer, court erred prej-
udicially, in prosecution for disturbing 
peace, in so defining "offensive" as to 
:nc1ude conduct protected by First Amend-
ment and in failing to instruct on con-
tention that spilling was accidental. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; U.S.C.A. 
Canst. Amend. 1. 
8. Breach of the Peace ¢::::'I 
Defendant's appearance at meeting with 
alleged intent to annoy _,airport board did 
not in and of itself constitute disturbance 
of the peace. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1. 
9. Breach of the Peace ~II 
Where complaint for disturbance of 
peace charged tumultuous and offensive 
conduct, but statute proscribed disturbance 
of peace by tumultuous or offensive con-
duct, instruction relieving jury from neces-
sity of agreeing to charge of both tumul-
tuous and offensive conduct was proper. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415. 
10. Indictment and Information <$=>125(20) 
Where statute lists several acts in dis-
junctive, anyone of which constitutes of-
fense, complaint, in alleging more than one 
of such acts, should do so in conjunctive 
to avoid uncertainty. West's Ann.Pen. 
Code, § 415. 
II. Witnesses ~386 
In prosecution for disturbance of peace, 
where defendant, who had been protesting 
condition of airport ruriways, testified that 
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some governmental agencies agreed with not reasonably related to future criminality. 
him but that others were either uncon- West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1. 
cerned or disagreed, letter from Feder-
al Aeronautics Administration disagreeing 
with defendant was not inconsistent with his 
testimony and could not be used to impeach, 
and should have been excluded as hearsay. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415. 
12. Criminal Law _82.6(5) 
If defendant considers conditions of 
probation more harsh than sentence which 
court would otherwise impose, he has right 
to refuse probation and undergo sentence. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1. 
13. Criminal Law 0&=>1134(10) 
Habeas Corpus 0&=>25.2(4) 
Defendant may challenge legality of 
any proposed conditions of probation on 
appeal from judgment or on habeas corpus. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1. 
14. Criminal Law ~1188 
If it is determined that proposed condi-
tion of probation is invalid, judgment should 
be vacated and defendant given opportunity 
to accept probation on lawful conditions. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1 
15. Habeas Corpus 0&=>25.2(4), 30(3) 
Although habeas corpus cannot serve as 
substitute for appeal to review determina-
tion of fact made on conflicting evidence, 
it may be used to review validity of sen-
tence or order of probation which can be 
corrected without redetermination of any 
questions of fact. West's Ann.Pen.Code, 
§ 1203.1. 
16. Criminal Law 0&=>982.5(2) 
Condition of probation is invalid if it 
(1) has no relationship to crime of which 
defendant is convicted, (2) relates to con-
duct which is not of itself criminal, or 
(3) requires or forbids conduct which is 
I. PeDnI Code section 415 provides: "E~ery 
person who maliciously and willfully dis-
turbs the peace or quiet of any neighbor-
hood or person, by loud or unusual noise, 
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, 
or threatening, traducing, quarreling, chal-
lenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on 
the public streets of any unincorporated 
town, or upon the public highways in such 
463 p .2d-461/z 
17. Criminal Law 0&=>982.5(2) 
Absent any evidence to support trial 
court's conclusion that defendant sentenced 
for disturbance of peace needed psychiatric 
care, imposition of requirement of psychia-
tric treatment as condition of probation was 
invalid. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 415, 
1203.1. 
John M. Sink, Santa Barbara, for pe-
titioner. 
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence 
R. Sperber, Los Angeles, as amici curiae 
on behalf of petitioner. 
David D. Minier, Dist. Atty., and A. Bar-
ry Cappello, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., for 
respondent. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
A jury found petitioner guilty of dis-
turbing the peace in violation of Penal 
Code section 415.1 The trial court imposed 
the maximum sentence (90 days in jail 
and a $200 fine), but suspended execution 
~f the sentence and granted probation. The 
conviction was affirmed by the appellate 
department of the superior court, which 
denied certification to the Court of Appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. (395 U.S. 944, 89 S.Ct. 2018, 
23 L.Ed.2d 463 (1969).) Petitioner now 
seeks habeas corpus in this court. 
Petitioner is a practicing attorney and a 
licensed private pilot. On numerous occa-
sions before the incident leading to his 
conviction, petitioner appeared before the 
Santa Maria Public Airport District Board 
of Directors in his capacity as an attorney 
and as a private pilot. During the year 
unincorporated town, run any horse-race, 
either for a wager or for amusement, or 
fire any gun or pistol in such unincor-
porated town, or use any vulgar, profane, 
or indecent language within the presence 
or hearing of women or children, in a 
loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of 
as misdemeanor, * * * OJ 
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preceding the incident, petitioner complained 
to the board about the condition of the 
runways at the airport. He alleged that 
the runways were cracked, pitted, weed-
grown, and littered with glass and metal 
debris. He was particularly concerned 
with significant amounts of loose gravel 
on the runways that were causing damage 
to his and others' aircraft. Petitioner's 
frequent complaints to the board apparent-
ly went unanswered. He testified that his 
relations with the members of the board 
had become so volatile that his mere pres-
ence at board meetings provoked anger and 
resentment. 
The day before a regular board .meeting, 
petitioner went to the airport's main runway 
with a broom, bucket, and dustpan. He 
made five parallel sweeps across the width 
of the runway, collecting approximately 10 
pounds of gravel and metal debris. On the 
morning of the following day, July 6, 1967, 
Donald M. Prentice, president of the airport 
board, convened a meeting of the full five-
member board. The roll call was taken and 
the first three items on the agenda were 
considered. As the board reached the 
fourth item, petitioner entered the room, 
carrying a bucket of gravel in both hands 
at chest level. Without speaking he walked 
to the desk where Prentice was presiding. 
According to the People's evidence peti-
tioner deliberately dumped the contents of 
the bucket over Prentice's desk and papers. 
Prentice called petitioner a "dirty low-down 
son of a bitch" and hit him. Members 
of the board's staff restrained Prentice, and 
petitioner walked from the room. Accord-
ing to petitioner's testimony he intended to 
set the bucket of debris upright on Pren-
tice's desk to demonstrate the condition of 
the runways to the board, the public, and 
the press, but accidentally spilled the con-
tents of the bucket when Prentice hit him. 
I 
Petitioner was charged by com'plaint with 
violating Penal Code section 415, in that 
he "did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously 
2. Petitioner was also charged with violat-
ing Penal Code section 403 (disturbing 
a meeting or assembly). The trial court 
disturb the peace and quiet of Donald M. 
Prentice and the Board of Directors of the 
Santa Maria Public Airport District by 
tumultuous and offensive conduct." 2, 
In this proceeding petitioner attacks his 
conviction on the grounds that Penal Code 
section 415 is unconstitutional and that er-
rors at the trial require reversal. We have 
concluded that the writ should be granted. 
Petitioner contends that section 415 is so 
vague, it provides no ascertainable stand-
ard of guilt and thus denies due process 
of law. He also contends that thr.: section 
is overbroad and makes punishable con-
duct protected by the First Amendment. 
[1,2] Section 415 is not unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. It has a com-
monly understood meaning that not only 
affords adequate notice of the type of con-
duct that is proscribed, but also precludes 
its application to conduct protected by the 
First Amendment. The part of the section 
under which petitioner was convicted pro-
vides: "Every person who maliciously and 
willfully disturbs the peace or quiet' of any 
* * * person * * * by tumultuous 
or offensive conduct * * * is guilty of 
a misdemeanor." The terms "disturb the 
peace" and "breach of the peace/, which are 
substantially synonymous, have long been 
understood to mean disruption of public 
order by acts that are themselves violent 
or that tend to incite others to violence. 
Thus, one may be guilty of disturbing the 
peace within that part of section 415 if 
he engages in "tumultuousll conduct, i. e., 
violent conduct that wilfully and maliciously 
endangers public safety or order. He may 
also be guilty of disturbing the peace 
through "offensive" conduct if by his ac-
tions he wilfully and maliciously incites 
others to violence or engages in conduct 
likely to incite others to violence. (People 
v. Cohen (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 94, 101, 81 
Cal.Rptr. 503.) 
[3] The foregoing construction of sec-
tion 415 assures that conduct protected by 
sustained a demurrer to the charge on 
the grounds that section 403 is uncon-
stitutional. 
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the First Amendment's guarantee of free- advised the jury that "'offensive' means 
dom of speech is not made criminal. Unlike giving offense; causing displeasure or re-
the city ordinance considered by the United sentment; insulting." The instruction 
States Supreme Court in Terminiello v. City makes criminal, conduct that is protected 
of Chicago (1948) 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, by the First Amendment. Moreover, the 
93 L!Ed. 1131, that permitted conviction if jury might have convicted petitioner on the 
one's speech "stirred people to anger, in- basis of such protected conduct without 
vited public dispute, or brought about a reaching the question whether the spilling 
condition of unrest" (337 U.S. 1, 5, 69 of the gravel was intentional or accidental. 
S.Ct. 894, 896), or the statute considered Thus, petitioner testified that his mere pres-
by that court in Cantwell v. Connecticut ence before the airport board of directors 
(1939) 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. caused anger and resentment. Accordingly, 
1213, that permitted conviction although the jury might have found petitioner guilty 
there was no clear and present danger to of "offensive conduct" if he made any ap-
public peace and order, that part of Penal pearance calculated to vex or annoy the 
Code section 415 in question here makes board -of directors,. regardless of whether 
punishable only wilful and malicious con- petiti~ner's conduct was violent or incited 
duct that is violent and endangers public others to violence. Moreover, the appellate 
safety and' order or that creates a clear department of the superior court, in af-
and present danger that others will engage firming petitioner's conviction, held that his 
in violence of that nature. appearance with the intent to annoy the 
[4-6] Petitioner contends that his con-
duct was a legitimate means of conveying 
his grievances to the airport directors. He 
urges that -his actions were a form of 
"synibolic speech" protected by the First 
Amendment. Not all acts intended to ex-
press ideas or convey information are pro-
tected forms of free speech. (United States 
v. O'Brien (1968) 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 
S.C!. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672; see also Adder-
ley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39, 47-48, 
87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149.) When pub-
lic order and safety are threatened by vio-
lence, states may restrict or punish the 
conduct that creates such threat. (Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296, 307-
311, 60 S.Ct. 900.) Inasmuch as that part 
of section 415 considered here does not 
make criminal any nonviolent act unless 
the act incites or threatens to incite others 
to violence, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether petitioner's act was "communica-
tion," for the test is the same whether 
acts are intended to communicate ideas 
or not. 
[7,8] The trial court, however, failed 
to instruct the jury in accordance with the 
foregoing construction of section 415, which 
preserves its constitutionality. The court 
board "in and of itself constituted a dis-
turbance of the peace." Under these cir-
cumstances, petitioner has discharged his 
burden on habeas corpus of proving that 
his conviction was based on constitutionally 
protected conduct. (In re Klor (1966) 64 
Ca1.2d 816, 821-822, 51 Ca1.Rptr. 903, 415 
P.2d 791.) 
In view of our conclusion that the con-
viction must be set aside because the jury 
was improperly instructed, it is not neces-
sary to consider all of petitioner's addi-
tional assignments of error. We consider 
some of these alleged errors, however, 
which may occur again on retrial, for the 
guidance of the trial court. (Code Civ. 
Proc. § 53.) 
Petitioner contends that the trial court 
erred in not instructing the jury that to 
find him guilty, they must find that his con-
duct was both tumultuous and offensive. 
[9] The complaint charged petitioner 
with "tumultuous and offensive conduct." 
In instructing the jury, the court said: "The 
defendant is charged in the Complaint to 
have maliciously disturbed the peace by 
tumultuous and offensive conduct. He may 
be found gnilty of maliciously disturbing 
the peace if you find that he did in fact 
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maliciously disturb that peace by tumult-
uous conduct or by offensive conduct alone. 
It is not necessary that you agree to the 
charge of both tumultuous and offensive 
conduct." That instruction was proper. 
[10] When a statute such as Penal Code 
section ... U5 lists several acts in the disjunc-
tive, anyone of which constitutes an of-
fense, the complaint, in alleging more than 
one of such acts, should do so in the con-
junctive to avoid uncertainty. (People v. 
Ah Woo (1865) 28 Cal. 205, 212; People 
v. O'Brien (1900) 130 Cal. 1,3-4,62 P. 297.) 
Merely because the complaint is phrased in 
the conjunctive, however, does not prevent 
a trier of fact from convicting a defendant 
if the evidence proves only one of the al-
leged acts. (People v. McClennegen (1925) 
195 Cal. 445,452,234 P. 91.) The jury could 
have found petitioner guilty of "tumultuous 
conduct" if the evidence proved that his con-
duct was maliciously and wilfully violent, 
endangering public safety and order. They 
might also have found him guilty of Hof_ 
fensive conduct" if his malicious and wilful 
actions incited others to violence, although 
his own conduct was not in itself violent. 
Petitioner objected to the introduction in-
to evidence of a letter to him from the 
Federal Aviation Administration, asserting 
that it was hearsay. The letter, dated Jan-
uary 23, 1968, acknowledges the receipt of 
two previous letters from petitioner, the 
earliest dated August 8, 1967 (one month 
after the alleged breach of the peace). The 
letter further stated that after receiving 
the two letters from petitioner the agency 
made inspections of the runways. They 
concluded on the basis of these inspections 
that the airport was being properly main-
tained. The letter did not refer to the con-
dition of the runways on or before July 6, -
1967. 
3. In nddition to the condition of probation 
in issue, the court required petitioner to 
make tl llromi}t and sincere apology to the 
president and members of the airport dis· 
trict board of directors; to reimburse the 
airport district $100 as payment for costs 
of cleaning, lost time and photography 
expenses; to resign as newly elected pres· 
[11] The People contend that the evi-
dence was not hearsay, on the ground that 
it was not introduced to prove the truth of 
the matters asserted therein, but to impeach 
petitioner's previous testimony. The con-
tention is without merit. Petitioner testi-
fied that he sent numerous letters to many 
agencies about the condition of the runways, 
and that he received different replies. Al-
though sonie agencies agreed with him, 
petitioner admitted that others were either 
unconcerned with the problem or disagreed 
with him entirely. One letter disagreeing 
with petitioner on the condition of the run-
ways cannot be used to impeach his testi-
mony since it is 110t inconsistent with it. 
Petitioner did not testify that the F.A.A. 
letter said anything other than what it did 
say. 
The letter of January 23, 1968, from the 
F.A.A. was hearsay and did not come within 
any exceptions to the hearsay rule. That 
letter, therefore, should have been excluded. 
Finally, the trial court suspended execu-
tion of petitioner's sentence and ordered 
that he be placed on two years' probation. 
In addition to the usual terms and condi-
tions of probation, the court imposed five 
special conditions.3 One condition required 
petitioner to seek psychiatric treatment at 
his own expense with a qualified psychia-
trist approved by the court, and to continue 
the treatment as required by the doctor and 
approved by the probation department and 
the court. Petitioner contends that imposi-
tion of this condition is beyond the court's 
jurisdiction. We agree. 
[12-15] When granting probation, 
courts have broad discretion to impose re-
strictive conditions to foster rehabilitation 
and to protect public safety. Penal Code 
section 1203.1 authorizes the court to im-
pose any "reasonable conditions, as it may 
ident of the airport board; and to submit 
himself to the local bar association for 
·possible disciplinary action. In affirming 
petitioner's conviction, the nppellate de~ 
partment of the superior court struck aU 
conditions except the one in issue and the 
condition of reimbursement. Petitioner 
does not contest the latter condition. 
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detennine are fitting and proper to the end There is no evidence to support the trial 
that justice may be done, * * * and speci- court's conclusion that petitioner needed 
fical1y for the reformation and rehabilita- psychiatric care. No expert witnesses testi-
tion of the probationer." If the defendant fied to mental condition. Neither the pro-
considers the conditions of probation more secution nOT the court questioned any wit-
harsh than the sentence the -court would nesses about that condition. Under these 
otherwise impose, he has the right to refuse 
probation and undergo the sentence. (In 
re Osslo (1958) 51 Cal.2d 371, 377, 334 P.2d 
1; People v. Frank (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 
740, 741-742, 211 P.2d 350.) In such case 
he may challenge the legality of any pro-
posed conditions of probation on an appeal 
from the judgment or on habeas corpus. 
(In re Osslo, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 382, 334 
P.2d 1; In re Allen (1%9) 71 A.C. 409, 
410, 78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143.) If it 
is determined that a proposed condition of 
probation is invalid, the judgment should 
be vacated and the defendant given an op-
portunity to accept probation on lawful con-
ditions. If, on the other hand, the defend-
ant accepts probation, he may seek relief 
from the restraint of any alleged invalid 
condition of probation on appeal from the 
order granting probation or on habeas cor-
pus. (In re Allen, supra, 71 A.C. at p. 410, 
78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143; In re Osslo, 
supra, 51 Cal.2d at pp. 381-382, 334 P.2d 1.) 
Although habeas corpus cannot serve as a 
substitute for appeal to review a determina-
tion of the fact made on conflicting evidence 
(In re Dixon (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 756,760, 264 
P.2d 513; In re Lindley (1947) 29 Ca1.2d 
709, 722, 177 P.2d 918), it may be used to 
review the validity of a sentence or order of 
probation that can be corrected without the 
redetermination of any questions of fact. 
(In re McInturff (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 876, 
880-$1, 236 P.2d 574; Neal v. State of 
California (1%0) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839.) 
[16,17] A condition of probation im-
posed pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1 
is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the 
crime of which the defendant is convicted, 
(2) relates to conduct that is not itself crim-
inal, or (3) requires or forbids conduct 
that is not reasonably related to future 
criminality. (People v. Dominguez (1%7) 
256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627, 64 Cal.Rptr. 290.) 
circumstances the condition as to psychi-
atric care had no relationship to the crime 
of which petitioner was convicted. Further-
more, without any showing that mental in-
stability contributed to that offense, psy-
chiatric care cannot reasonably be related to 
future -criminality. 
The writ of habeas corpus is granted, and 
petitioner is discharged from the custody 
imposed by the Municipal Court of the 
Santa Maria Judicial District pursuant to 
the judgment of May 28, 1%8. 
PETERS, TOBRINER, MOSK and 
SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. 
BURKE, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent, for in my view petitioner clearly 
failed to prove that his conviction was 
based solely upon conduct which the majori-
ty hold to be constitutionally protected. 
The majority rely exclusively upon In re 
Klor, 64 Cal.2d 816, 822, 51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 
907, 415 P.2d 791, 795, wherein this court 
stated: "We have held that a petitioner, 
who collaterally attacks a conviction based 
upon a statute containing both valid and 
invalid portions bears the 'burden of prov-
ing that he was not tried and convicted for 
violating the valid part of the statute.' (In 
re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 504 [122 P.2d 
22].)" 
In Klor, we granted habeas corpus after 
concluding that "So strong was the evidence 
tending to establish petitioner's guilt ,under I 
the erroneous portion of the charge and ,so 
weak! the evidence which would ground a 
·conv~cti~n under 'the valid portion that we 
determine that petitioner can discharge his 
'burden bf proving that he was not * * * 
conviction for violating the valid part. 
* * *,,, 
On the other hand, in In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 
488, 122 P.2d 22, cited as controlling in Klar 
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we discharged the writ or. the ground that 
"Petitioners in the present case have failed 
to sustain the burden of proving that t~ey 
were not tried and convicted for acts of 
violence since the transcripts of testimony at 
their trials reveal evidence of such acts. * * 
Because petitioners have failed to sustain 
the burden of proving that they were not 
convicted of the one valid provision of the 
ordinance prohibiting acts of violence, the 
writ heretofore issued is discharged and the 
petitioners are remanded to the custody of 
the sheriff of Yuba County." (Italics add-
ed; 19 Cal.2d at pp. 504-505, 122 P.2d at 
pp. 31-32.) 1 
The instant case is governed by BeU, not 
by Klor. Unlike Klor, the evidence sup-
porting petitioner's conviction under the 
valid portion of Penal Code section 415 was, 
in a word, overwhelming. The record dis-
closes that petitioner entered the board 
meeting and thereupon deliberately dumped 
10 pounds of gravel and debris on President 
Prentice's desk, thereby provoking Prentice 
to lose his temper and to strike petitioner.! 
The majority correctly assert that section 
415 may validly be applied to "violent con-
duct that wilfully and maliciously endangers 
public safety or order'~ (italics added), as 
well as to "'offensive' conduct if by his 
actions he wilfully and maliciously incites 
others to violence * * *." (Ante, p. 
730.) * Petitioner's conduct in disrupting 
a public meeting and in inciting Prentice to 
violence, clearly satisfied either standard. 
The majority hypothesize that the jury 
"might" have convicted petitioner on the 
basis of his mere presence at the meeting. 
But BeU and Klor foreclose all such specu-
lation by placing the burden upon petitioner 
I. Accord, In re Carlson, 64 Ca1.2d 70, 73-
75. 48 Cal.Rptr. 875, 410 P.2d 379. It 
should be noted that both the Bell case 
and the instant case involved convictions 
affirmed by the appellate department of 
the superior court, without further ap-
peal. Thus, the Bell test regarding the 
burden of proof in habeas corpus proceed· 
ings is controlling here. 
2. The otlly evidence to the contrary was 
petitioner's own testimony that he ac-
cidentally spilled the gravel after Pren-
to prove the jury's nonreliance upon valid 
grounds for conviction by establishing the 
insubstantiality of the evidence supporting 
those grounds. In KlorJ that evidence was 
characterized as "weak." In Bell~ as in the 
instant cas~, the contrary was true. There-
fore, in effect, the majority opinion over-
rules Bell and Klor and improperly discards 
their requirement that petitioner bear the 
burden of proving the invalidity of his con-
viction. 
McCOMB, J., concurs. 
o i "~ff"''''"M='':::'''''''''''='M'' , 
83 Ca1.Rptr. 382 
In re Ralph MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 13858. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan, 23, 1970. 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus by 
prisoner seeking release on ground that 
adult authority's determination to terminate 
his parole status was based on evidence 
obtained through unconstitutional search 
and seizure and improperly obtained con-
fession. The Supreme Court, Tobriner, 
J., held that adult authority in deciding to 
reaffirm revocation of petitioner's parole 
from 1955 sentence could properly con-
sider evidence and statements used in ob-
taining 1963 conviction even though 1963 
conviction had been reversed on ground 
tice swore at him and grabbed his arm. 
This testimony was repudiated by the 
other witnesses and by a tape recording 
establishing that petitioner dumped the 
gravel before Prentice swore at him. The 
trial court bluntly characterized petition-
er's testimony as "perjury," stating that 
"The jury did not believe the testimony 
of Mr. Bushman that the dumping of the 
gravel wns an accident." 
• Opinion, p. 730. 
